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The Role of (Junk) Science in Wilderness Management:
Lessons Learned in the Wake of Drakes Bay Oyster
Company
Julia Graeser*
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THE WILDERNESS ACT: THE PURPOSE, THE PROCESS, AND THE LEGAL
REGIME

II.
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DESIGNATION
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THE SECRETARY’S MEMORANDUM OF DECISION: FINALITY AT LAST
SCIENTIFIC MISCONDUCT: DEFINITION AND RESPONSE
THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN THE SECRETARY’S DECISION

III.
IV.
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VI.

The term “wilderness” has long captured a tension deeply rooted in the
American spirit. It referred to the vast swaths of virgin territory to be settled
and sold in the name of progress, while paradoxically also reflecting our
unique connection with the natural lands that we, as a young nation, once
had in such abundance.1 Over time, our relationship with wilderness took
on spiritual, even transcendental, dimensions. As we have transformed
wilderness with people and industry, so too has wilderness transformed us
with its awe-inspiring natural bounty.2
“Wilderness” has also become a term of important societal and legal
significance, as evidenced by the controversy surrounding California’s

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2013;
B.A., Indiana University, 2009. I would like to thank Professor John Leshy for his
insights in shaping this Note and my most beloved family and friends for their
ongoing support.
1. Leshy, John, Contemporary Politics of Wilderness Preservation, 25 J. LAND RESOURCES
& ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (2005).
2. Robert L. Glicksman & George Cameron Coggins, Wilderness in Context, 76
DENV. U. L. REV. 383, 384 (1999). For a more fully developed historical account of the
wilderness preservation movement, see RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN
MIND (4th ed. 2001).
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largest oyster farm operation,3 Drakes Bay Oyster Company (“DBOC”),
located about forty miles northwest of San Francisco in western Marin
County.4 DBOC is situated within the Point Reyes National Seashore on
lands that are owned in fee by the United States, administered by the
National Park Service, and leased out primarily to local cattle ranchers and
dairy farmers.5 More specifically, DBOC conducts its operations in Drakes
Estero,6 a system of five fingerlike branching bays just north of Drakes Bay
that Congress designated as “potential wilderness area” over forty years
ago.7
The question of whether DBOC should be allowed to continue
operating on those lands after the expiration of its original lease has not
been an easy one to answer. As discussed in this article, the National Park
Service (“Park Service”) complicated this question considerably with its
haphazard use of science to justify what officials regarded from the
beginning as a matter of national wilderness policy.8 The answer came on
November 29, 2012, when Ken Salazar, the Secretary of the Interior, issued a
memorandum of decision announcing that the DBOC lease would not be
renewed,9 and that Drakes Estero would be converted to the wilderness area

3. Peter Fimrite, Scientists Side with Drakes Bay Oyster Farmer, S.F. CHRON., May 6,
2009, http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Scientists-side-with-Drakes-Bay-oysterfarmer-3242873.php.
4. See NAT’L PARK SERV., DRAKES BAY OYSTER COMPANY SPECIAL USE PERMIT DRAFT
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT [hereinafter DEIS] v (Sept. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.nps.gov/pore/parkmgmt/planning_dboc_sup_deis.htm.
5. Id. at vi. For a closer look at the relationship between the area’s biological
abundance and its local industry and culture, see PAUL SADIN, MANAGING A LAND IN
MOTION: AN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF POINT REYES NATIONAL SEASHORE 19-25 (2007),
available at http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/pore/admin.pdf.
6. Drakes Estero encompasses roughly 2,500 acres, and its watershed covers
approximately thirty-one square miles. See DEIS, supra note 4, at vi.
7. Congress had never used the term “potential wilderness” before October
1976 when it designated the 8,002 acres surrounding Drakes Estero as such, without
providing any definition of the term in the statute. See infra notes 42-51. An Act to
Designate Certain Lands in the Point Reyes National Seashore, California, as
Wilderness, Amending the Act of September 13, 1962 (76 Stat. 538), as Amended (16
U.S.C. 459c–6a), and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 94–544, § 1, 90 Stat. 2515 (1976).
8. Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of the Interior San Francisco Field Solicitor to
the Point Reyes National Seashore Superintendent [hereinafter DOI Memo] (Feb. 26,
2004), http://www.mmc.gov/drakes_estero/pdfs/ltr_doi_opinion_22604.pdf.
9. Memorandum of Decision from Secretary Kenneth Salazar, U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior, to Dir., Nat’l Park Serv. [hereinafter Salazar decision] 2 (Nov. 29, 2012),
308
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that Congress had originally envisioned.10 This paper will tell this tale from
the beginning of American wilderness protection to what appears to be the
end of DBOC,11 and explain how each reflects and relates to the other.
Among the many lessons to be learned from the story, one theme runs
throughout—the use and misuse of science in an effort to protect our
wilderness. While a critique of the Park Service’s methodology is in order,
the decision itself was laudable. Most importantly, it reflected the agency’s
responsibility to be transparent about the reasons underlying its decisions.
Because of the Park Service’s reliance on scant science and opaque dealings,
the Secretary’s decision is remarkable not for the actual conclusion reached,
but for the reasons given to support it. Salazar based the decision on
plainly stated policy judgments, which recognized existing scientific
uncertainties12 and reflected a difficult choice between different but equally
legitimate public values.13

I.

The Wilderness Act: The Purpose, the Process, and the
Legal Regime

Following nine years of deliberation and sixty-five different bills,14
Congress passed the Wilderness Act in 1964 (hereinafter “the Act”).15
Though the battle was primarily waged by a so-called “preservationist elite”
fighting against dominant economic interests, the Act’s victory represented
a widespread change in public opinion about the importance of protecting

http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/secretary-salazar-issues-decision-on-pointreyes-national-seashore-permit.cfm.
10.

Id. at 5, 7.

11. On February 25, 2013, the Ninth Circuit granted Plaintiff’s emergency
motion for an injunction pending appeal of the District Court’s denial of preliminary
injunction, set to be heard in May of 2013, Drakes Bay Oyster Co., et al. v. Salazar, et
al., No. 13-15227 (9th Cir. filed Feb. 25, 2013), available at http://cdn.ca9.
uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2013/02/25/13-15227_order_granting_injunction_pe
nding _appeal_and_expediting_calendaring.pdf. (last visited Mar. 1, 2013). For
more information on the current litigation, see infra notes 127-131.
12.

Id. at 5.

13. Id. at 6 (“I am aware that allowing DBOC’s existing authorizations to expire
by their terms will result in dislocation of DBOC’s business and may result in the loss
of jobs for the approximately 30 people currently employed by DBOC.”).
14. Daniel Rohlf & Douglas L. Honrold, Managing the Balances of Nature: The Legal
Framework of Wilderness Management, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 251 (1988).
15. Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577, § 1-7, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2006)).
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West

Northwest, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2013

our yet undeveloped areas.16 The Act created the National Wilderness
Preservation System with over 9.1 million acres that had already been
classified by the U.S. Forest Service,17 and provided that only Congress could
add to the system by making future designations.18 Since its creation, the
National Wilderness Preservation System has grown almost every year to
encompass more land than the size of California, approximately 5% of the
entire United States.19
In outlining the purposes of the Act, Congress articulated goals that
are interrelated but conceptually distinct.20 The Act was intended to first
protect existing wilderness lands from “expanding settlement and growing
mechanization,” and second, to preserve them “for the use and enjoyment of
the American people in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for
future use and enjoyment as wilderness.”21 Legislative history indicates,
however, that it was not just preservation for its own sake that provided the
necessary impetus. Preserving opportunities for recreation and scientific
study in wild areas were also primary motives.22 Additionally, at least one
scholar has argued that another goal of the Act was to accommodate select
local and commercial interests.23
The Act bars most commercial enterprise, permanent and temporary
roads, and motorized vehicles and equipment from designated wilderness
areas.24 Furthermore, the Act withdrew wilderness areas from consideration
for mineral appropriation and leasing.25 But Congress had to accommodate
the communities and industries already present in the areas designated as
wilderness, and commercial activity was therefore not prohibited across the

16. Delbert V. Mercure, Jr. & William M. Ross, The Wilderness Act: A Product of
Congressional Compromise, in CONGRESS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 47 (Richard A. Cooley &
Geoffrey Wandesfore-Smith eds., 1970).
17.

16 U.S.C. § 1131 (1982); see also Rohlf & Honrold, supra note 14, at 251.

18. See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (“A recommendation of the President for
designation as wilderness shall become effective only if so provided by an Act of
Congress”).
19.

Leshy, supra note 1, at 1.

20.

Rohlf & Honrold, supra note 14, at 279.

21.

16 U.S.C. § 1131(a).

22.

Rohlf & Honrold, supra note 14, at 255-256.

23.

Id. at 258.

24. 16 U.S.C. § 1134(c) (“Except as specifically provided for in this chapter, and
subject to existing private rights, there shall be no commercial enterprise . . . within
any wilderness area designated by this chapter”).
25. Id. § 4(d)(3) (“Commercial services may be performed within [] wilderness
areas . . . to the extent necessary for activities which are proper for realizing the
recreational or other wilderness purposes of the areas.”).
310
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board.26 The statute’s principal management directive is found in section
4(b), which affirmatively requires an administering agency27 to preserve the
pristine character of designated wilderness areas, subject to exceptions set
forth in later provisions.28 Section 4(c) lists the type of activities and objects
to be banned from wilderness areas, including roads, motorized vehicles and
equipment, permanent structures, and commercial enterprises.29
However, an administering agency may permit commercial services in
wilderness areas pursuant to section 5 when “proper for realizing the
recreational or other wilderness purposes.”30 For example, established uses
of aircraft or motorboats may be permitted,31 as well as other commercial
services necessary for valid wilderness pursuits.32 In contrast, other
exceptions protect existing private rights that the agency is bound to
recognize.33 Especially important to a ranching community like Point Reyes
is the Act’s allowance of continued livestock grazing, where previously
established, subject to reasonable regulation.34

26.

Id.

27. When Congress designates an area for inclusion in the National
Wilderness Preservation System, the federal agency with jurisdiction over the area
immediately prior to the designation continues to manage it. See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b).
28. The requirements of section 4(b) apply “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in
this chapter.” Id.
29. Section 4(c) provides in full: “Except as specifically provided for in this
chapter, and subject to existing private rights, there shall be no commercial
enterprise and no permanent road within any wilderness area designated by this
chapter and, except as necessary to meet minimum requirements for the
administration of the area for the purpose of the this chapter (including measures
required in emergencies involving the health and safety of persons within the area),
there shall be no temporary road, no use of motor vehicles, motorized equipment or
motor boats, no land of aircraft, no other form of mechanical transport, and no
structure or installation within any such area.” Id. § 1133(c).
30.

Id. § 1133(d).

31.

See id. § 4(d)(1).

32.

See id. § 4(d)(6).

33. See id. § 4(c) (“subject to existing private rights, there shall be no commercial
enterprise . . .”) (emphasis added). For a detailed description of the Act’s exceptions
to prohibited uses in designated wilderness areas, see Nell Green Nylem, Elisabeth
Long, Mary Loum, Heather Welles, Dan Carlin, Brynn Cook, & Sage Adams, Will
Wilderness be Diluted in Drakes Bay?, 39 ECOLOGY LAW CURRENTS 46, 51 (2012),
http://elq.typepad.com/currents/2012/currents39-05-greennylen-2012-0826.pdf.
34.

See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4).
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The Act contains more significant exceptions as well, which reflect the
major political compromise required to successfully pass the Act.35 For
example, the President has open-ended authority to approve reservoirs and
major water works, power projects, and “other facilities needed in the public
interest.”36 The Act also provided for a twenty-year window in which hardrock mining companies could stake new mining claims and the Secretary of
the Interior could issue new oil, gas, and coal leases in national forest
wilderness areas.37 Despite the Act’s overarching preservationist mandate,
these exceptions demonstrate the significant amount of discretion afforded
to the executive branch, on which wilderness protection would largely
depend.

II.

Point Reyes National Seashore Establishment and
Wilderness Designation

In 1962, Congress established the Point Reyes National Seashore (“the
Seashore”) as a new type of operating unit within the national park system.38
Seeking to preserve the peninsula’s agricultural traditions, Congress
included a large “pastoral zone” within the Seashore to accommodate lease
agreements with existing dairy farmers and ranchers.39
There was
subsequently a great deal of controversy over the Park Service’s plans to
develop the area for tourism.40 It was not long after the Act was passed that
local residents and environmental groups began pushing for the heightened
protection that could only be assured through congressional designation as
wilderness.41
In 1976, Congress designated 25,370 acres of the Seashore as
wilderness and identified another 8,003 acres (including Drakes Estero) as
“potential wilderness” in Public Law 94-567.42 No such category existed in

35. Mercure & Ross, supra note 16, at 58 (“[I]n the fall of 1963 it became
obvious to the preservations that time and the realities of congressional power were
against them and that it was better to get some protection rather than none at all. It
was also recognized that while they had to invest huge amounts of money in an
attempt to arouse the public, the opposition had friends of long standing in
Congress who could block the measure forever.”); see also Leshy, supra note 1, at 2-3.
36.

See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4).

37.

Id. § 1133(d)(3).

38. See Pub. L. No. 94–544, § 1, 90 Stat. 2515 (1976); see also SADIN supra note 5,
109-110.
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39.

Pub. L. No. 87-657, § 4, 76 Stat. 538 (1962).

40.

SADIN, supra note 5, at 165-168.

41.

Id. at 169-170.

42.

Pub. L. No. 87-657, 76 Stat. 538 (1962).
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the Wilderness Act of 1964,43 and this was the first time Congress had used
the term, though it included no definition within the text of the statute.44
Accompanying Public Law 94-567 was a House Report stating that areas
designated as potential wilderness “will be essentially managed as
wilderness, to the extent possible, with the efforts to steadily continue to
remove all obstacles to the eventual conversion of these lands and waters to
wilderness status.”45 Public Law 94-567’s Senate Report added that Drakes
Bay would achieve full wilderness status “when the Federal government
gains full title to these lands and when non-conforming uses and/or
structures are eliminated.”46
Although the Park Service has not promulgated official regulations, it
has adopted internal management policies that define potential wilderness
areas as “lands that are surrounded by or adjacent to lands proposed for
wilderness designation but that do not themselves qualify for immediate
designation due to temporary, nonconforming, or incompatible
conditions.”47 These lands must be managed as wilderness to the extent
that existing nonconforming conditions allow, with non-conforming uses
phased out “as soon as practicable.”48 This policy applies equally to
congressionally designated potential wilderness areas as to undesignated
potential wilderness areas—that is, those that the agency has merely
recommended for designation because of their wilderness characteristics.49
In either instance, the Park Service policy is that all nonconforming uses are
to “be eliminated as soon as practicable.”50
The 1976 statute contains language that is more passive. It states only
that potential wilderness additions would become designated wilderness
when “all uses thereon prohibited by the Widerness Act. . . . have ceased.”51
DBOC supporters argue that, even without DBOC, this is not the case in

43.

Id.

44.

Id.; see 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136.

45.

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1680, at 3 (1976).

46.

S. REP. NO. 94-1357, at 7 (1976).

47. NAT’L PARK SERV., MANAGEMENT POLICIES, 6.2.2.1 (2006) (6.2.2.1 Potential
Wilderness), available at http://www.nps.gov/policy/mp2006.pdf.
48.

Id., 6.3.1 (Wilderness Resource Management, General Policy).

49. Id. For a fuller discussion of the differences between designated and
undesignated potential wilderness areas, see Nylem et al., supra note 33, at 54.
50. NAT’L PARK SERV., Director’s Order 41: Wilderness Preservation and
Management § B(3)(d)(vi) (1999), http://www.nps.gov/refdesk/DOrders/DOrder
41.html.
51.

S. REP. NO. 94-1357, at 7 (1976).
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Drakes Estero because of California’s retained rights to fishing and mining.52
They highlight the “full title” language included in Public Law 94-567’s
Senate Report to assert that full wilderness conversion is inappropriate.53
Although the notice published in the Federal Register converting Drakes Bay to
full wilderness declared Drakes Estero to be “entirely in federal ownership,”54
DBOC argues this statement cannot be true given California Department of
Fish and Game’s intention to continue leasing Drakes Estero for shellfish
cultivation.55 Because of this inconsistency, DBOC supporters contend that
the area’s conversion to full wilderness actually contravenes congressional
intent.56
Wilderness supporters consider the congressional intent more broadly,
in light of the statute’s basic purposes and strict prohibitions. A piece
written by a group of law students at UC Berkeley entitled “Will Wilderness be
Diluted in Drakes Bay?” carefully outlines the twenty-nine congressionally
designated potential wilderness areas and describes in detail the
nonconforming uses thereon.57 Compared to other nonconforming uses, the
authors determine that “DBOC operations constitute a highly unusual
nonconforming use” and, thus, that an extension for a “non-recreationfocused commercial enterprise” would “be unique and without precedent.”58
Not only would such an extension lack precedent, it would “contravene the
designating legislation’s intent, the Wilderness Act’s purpose and
substance, and NPS’s own management guidance.”59
What is incontrovertible is that at the time that Congress passed the
Point Reyes Wilderness Act, the area was already home to dairy farmers,
ranchers, and shellfish farmers.60 Mariculture entrepreneurs had been
operating in Point Reyes since the early 1900s.61 After the establishment of
the Seashore, a decade-long negotiation ensued between the Park Service
and Charles Johnson, the owner of the locally based Johnson Oyster

52. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 26, Drakes Bay Oyster Co., et al. v. Salazar, et
al., No. 13-15227 (9th Cir. filed Feb. 25, 2013); see also Declaration in Support of
Appellant’s Motion (Ex. 9) (CFGC letter stating that it “has clearly authorized”
DBOC’s shellfish cultivation “through at least 2029” in “the proper exercise of its
jurisdiction.”).
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53.

Id.

54.

77 Fed. Reg. 71826 (Dec. 4, 2012).

55.

Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 52, at 27.

56.

Id. at 26.

57.

See Nylem et al., supra note 33.

58.

Id. at 56-57.

59.

Id. at 63.

60.

See SADIN, supra note 5, 19-25.

61.

See DEIS, supra note 4, at v.
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Company.62 Johnson sold five acres to the Park Service but retained a fortyyear reservation of use and occupancy (RUO) allowing him to continue
operations on one and a half acres.63 This RUO provided Johnson
[and] its successors and assigns, a terminable right to use and
occupy the . . . property . . . for a period of 40 years for the
purpose of processing and selling wholesale and retail oysters
[and] seafood . . . the interpretation of oyster cultivation to the
visiting public, and residential purposes reasonably
incidental. . . . Upon expiration of the reserved term, a special
use permit may be issued for the continued occupancy of the
property and the herein described purposes.”64
It is the last sentence of the RUO that would become the source of
considerable debate.
Over thirty years later, in late 2004, a local rancher named Kevin Lunny
purchased Johnson Oyster Company’s assets and renamed the operation
Drakes Bay Oyster Company. With the purchase, Lunny assumed the
remainder of the forty-year onshore RUO, considered a deeded property
interest, and a special use permit (SUP) for a septic leach field and well on
an adjacent property, set to expire in 2008.65 Despite the RUO’s renewal
clause, the Park Service was transparent about the fact that renewing the
RUO was against the agency’s management policies as well as the
congressional wilderness mandates to which it was bound.66 At the time,
Lunny was aware of the Park Service’s position that the RUO would
terminate without renewal, after which no SUP would be granted.67
The SUP that was signed in 2008, which was to expire concurrently with
the RUO, allowed DBOC to continue its onshore motorboat operations and
maintain 142 acres of shellfish beds within Drakes Estero.68 As a part of the
negotiations surrounding the SUP, Lunny agreed to clean and update the
oyster operation to conform to existing “state of the art” environmental
standards.69 He reportedly spent more than $300,000 on renovations: a new

62.

Id.

63.

Id.

64.

Id. (emphasis added).

65.

Id. at 19, 77-78.

66.

DOI Memo, supra note 8.

67. Id.; see also Oyster Farming in Drakes Bay (KQED Public Radio, hosted by Scott
Shafer, June 30, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 KQED broadcast], http://www.kqed.
org/a/forum/R906301000.
68.

DEIS, supra note 4, at vi.

69.

2009 KQED broadcast, supra note 67.
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septic system, demolition of existing buildings that were not up to
environmental standards, permitting water systems, and hauling out 1800
cubic yards of debris left behind by the Johnson family operation.70
As the largest oyster farm in California,71 DBOC produces roughly a
third of the state’s supply of shellfish72 and regularly employs around thirty
people at a time.73 Since 2004, it has expanded to produce approximately
460,000 pounds of shucked oysters and one million Manila clams each
year.74 To accomplish this, nearly 1,000 oyster bags have been distributed
throughout the estuary.75 The company also uses oyster racks, some of
which are located outside the area permitted by the SUP, and employs small
motorboats and trucks that run at least once a day.76 Since 2007, the
California Coastal Commission (“CCC”) has taken repeated action against
DBOC for various state law violations including unpermitted development
and discharge of marine debris.77 These actions culminated on February 6,
2013, when the California Coastal Commission voted 8-0 to implement its
most recent Cease and Desist order.78 Lunny maintains that he applied for
the necessary coastal development permit in 2005 and had been in the

70.

Id.

71.

Fimrite, supra note 3.

72. Lunny stated in an interview that the often-quoted 40% figure does not
come DBOC, rather from California Fish and Game. He neither supported nor denied
its accuracy. See Drakes Bay Oyster Company Sues to Stay (KQED Public Radio, hosted by
Michael Krasny, Dec. 5, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 KQED broadcast], http://www.
kqed.org/a/forum/R201212050900.
73. Paul Payne, Oyster farm’s closure could lead to higher oyster prices,
PRESSDEMOCRAT.COM, Dec. 6, 2012, http://www.pressdemocrat.com/article/20121205/
ARTICLES/121209773/1350?p=1&tc=pg.
74.

Fimrite, supra note 3.

75.

DEIS, supra note 4, at 61, 67.

76. The 2008 SUP includes a harbor seal protocol that restricts operations,
including boat travel, in certain areas. Though the Park Service issued a letter to
DBOC in January of 2013 asserting that their actions violated the plain language of
this provision, DBOC has maintained that its operations are not incompliant. See
NAT’L PARK SERV., DRAKES BAY OYSTER COMPANY SPECIAL USE PERMIT FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT [hereinafter FEIS] 100 (Nov. 20 2012), available at http://parkplan
ning.nps.gov/document.cfm?parkID=333&projectID=33043&documentID=50651.
77. For more information, see the California Coastal Commission website,
http://www.coastal.ca.gov/.
78. A video of the Feb. 6 public hearing is available at mms://media.calspan.org/calspan/Video_Files/CCC/CCC_13-02-07/CCC_13-02-07.wmv [beginning at
2:09:38] (last visited Feb. 28, 2013); see also Cease and Desist Order No. CCC 13-CD-01
(Nov. 29, 2007), http://documents.coastal.ca.gov/reports/2007/12/W6-12-2007.pdf.
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process of seeking to obtain that permit ever since.79 In Lunny’s view, the
same activists who have fought the lease renewal from the beginning are the
ones who also alleged the CCC violations80“[w]e know we’re under the
microscope,” Lunny stated,81 “[t]he last thing we’re doing is violating any
rules.”82

III.

Science Enters the Scene

The “microscope” that Lunny describes is the result of a debate that
began in 2006 when local newspapers reported various scientific studies
suggesting the DBOC had only a negligible effect on the Estero ecosystem.83
In response, the Park Service published on its website a report entitled
“Drakes Estero: A Sheltered Wilderness Estuary” (“Sheltered Wilderness report”)
written by a senior Park Service scientist, Dr. Sarah Allen.84 Allen’s report
claimed that the oyster farm damaged eelgrass beds, reduced the number of
harbor seals, potentially hastened the spread of nonnative species, and
increased sedimentation in the estuary.85 Of greatest concern was the Park
Service’s allegation that DBOC was solely to blame for an 80% decline in the
local harbor seal population.86
It is hard to imagine that anyone in the Park Service could have
anticipated the controversy soon to follow. Dr. Corey Goodman, a local
neurobiologist and member of the National Academy of Sciences, was
shocked by the report and immediately requested to review the data.
Jonathan Jarvis, National Park Service Director of Pacific West Region,
denied access to the data citing “deliberative process privilege.” Goodman
then went to Senator Dianne Feinstein with his concerns and, a month later,
in July of 2007, the two went to Point Reyes to discuss the problem with Park

79.

See 2012 KQED broadcast, supra note 72.

80.

Id.

81.

Id.

82.

Id.

83. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., INVESTIGATIVE REPORT: POINT
REYES NATIONAL SEASHORE 7 (July 11, 2008) [hereinafter INS. GEN. REPORT] (citing Peter
Jamison, Drakes Bay Oyster Company Has Little Impact on Estero, PT. REYES LIGHT, May 16,
2006), available on the Department of Interior website, http://www.
doi.gov/oig/reports/index.cfm.
84. DRAKES ESTERO: A SHELTERED WILDERNESS, POINT REYES NATIONAL SEASHORE
(May 11, 2007) [hereinafter SHELTERED WILDERNESS], http://mmc.gov/drakes_estero/
pdfs/nps_swilderness_51107.pdf.
85.

INS. GEN. REPORT, supra note 83, at 10-16.

86.

Id. at 16.
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Service officials.87 Feinstein directed Jarvis to take down the report from the
website and turn over the data upon which it had relied in reaching its
conclusions.88
After Feinstein’s summit meeting, the Park Service promptly removed
the Sheltered Wilderness report from its website and published a
“Clarification of Law, Policy, and Science on Drakes Estero” (“Clarification report”)
two months later.89
The Clarification report acknowledged “several
discrepancies” and revised its statements on DBOC’s ecological impacts.90
The revised report, however, did not include contributions from peer
reviewers.91 Although the Park Service purported to retract its claims against
DBOC in the Clarification report, it did so with conspicuous subtlety. Lunny
and Goodman, of course, considered it “intentionally misleading,” and
claimed the Park Service had “buried these retractions in the middle of
paragraphs and sections that appeared to the casual reader to be a
validation of the [Park Service’s] claims and a rebuttal to Goodman.”92
An example of this reporting tactic appears in the Park Service’s
treatment of the harbor seal data, previously reported as an 80% decline
resulting from DBOC operations. The data NPS turned over to Goodman
showed that only one of the eight subsites studied had declined by 80% in
2007, and that subsite was actually in the designated wilderness area, far away
from the oyster farm, and the decline was most likely attributable to park

87.

Id. at 17-18.

88.

Id. at 7.

89. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE CLARIFICATION OF LAW, POLICY, AND SCIENCE ON DRAKES
ESTERO (Sept. 18, 2007) [hereinafter CLARIFICATION], http://www.npca.org/assets/pdf/
nps_drakes_estero.pdf; see also Ins. Gen. Report, supra note 83, at 16.
90. Id. at 16; see also COMM. ON BEST PRACTICES FOR SHELLFISH MARICULTURE AND THE
EFFECTS OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES IN DRAKES ESTERO, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SHELLFISH
MARICULTURE IN DRAKES ESTERO, POINT REYES NATIONAL SEASHORE, CALIFORNIA 72-79
(2009) [hereinafter NRC REPORT] (comparing the Clarification with earlier versions of
the Sheltered Wilderness report).
91. Letter from Dr. Corey Goodman to Ken Salazar 7 (May 16, 2009) (“Dr. Peter
Gleick, NAS member, MacArthur Fellow, Founder of the Pacific Institute, and wellknown environmentalist, reviewed Jarvis’ “Clarification” document, and wrote: “…
this NPS ‘rebuttal’ … acknowledges very clearly that the NPS was wrong and
Goodman was right, over and over and over again, but couched in language that
pretends the opposite.”), http://www.eenews.net/assets/2012/02/13/document_
gw_02.pdf.
92. Letter from Cause of Action to Doris Lowery, Nat’l Park Serv. Washington
Admin. Program Ctr. (Aug. 7, 2012) (containing Information Quality Act complaint),
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/102351268/Lunny-and-Goodman-ComplaintAbout-Information-Quality-to-NPS-08-07-2012.
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visitors.93 Nevertheless, the Clarification report stated merely that “[m]ore
focused analyses are required to determine if oyster operations are affecting
seal distribution and productivity within Drakes Estero.”94
Those reports were just the beginning of the scrutiny soon to follow.
Senator Feinstein petitioned the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a
formal, independent National Research Counsel (“NRC”) review,95 and Lunny
requested that the Interior Department conduct an investigation. The
Inspector General then interviewed seventy-eight individuals, searched
Seashore offices with a Computer Crimes Unit, and reviewed over 1,100
documents and e-mails.96
In a July 2008 report, the Inspector General concluded that Seashore
officials made “concerted attempts” to find environmental harm and, in
doing so, had “misrepresented” their scientific research.97 For example, the
Wilderness Report stated that DBOC oysters were “the primary source” of
sedimentation in Drakes Estero, when in fact outside studies showed only
that oyster waste was a factor in sedimentation in the specific water bodies
where the studies were conducted.98 Similarly, the Park Service claimed that
the oyster racks “severely restricted” eelgrass growth, although available
research showed “no pronounced impacts” on eelgrass.99 The Inspector’s
report also highlighted Dr. Allen’s actions as lead scientist, such as
withholding information contrary to characterizations later made in the 2007
Sheltered Wilderness report and deleting e-mails that should have been
released in response to multiple Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)
requests.100 The report presented the Inspector’s factual findings without
making any subjective judgments about the appropriateness of the officials’
conduct. This task was apparently left to Mary Bomar, the Director of the
Park Service, to whom the report was directed “for whatever administrative
action she deems appropriate.”101
The NRC accepted Feinstein’s request for review and commenced a
panel of experts to “assess the scientific basis” for the Park Service’s public
presentations and Sheltered Wilderness report.”102 In May of 2009, the

93.

Fimrite, supra note 3; see also NRC REPORT, supra note 82, at 4-5, 77.

94.

CLARIFICATION, supra note 89, at 13.

95.

NRC REPORT, supra note 90, at 18-19.

96.

INS. GEN. REPORT, supra note 83, at 5-6.

97.

Id. at 2.

98.

Id. at 12.

99.

Id. at 19.

100. Id. at 2 (Allen “was privy to information contrary to her characterization[s]
. . . and did nothing to correct the information before its release to the public.”).
101.

Id. at 1.

102.

NRC REPORT, supra note 90, at 2.
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NRC’s report was released. It found a “lack of strong scientific evidence” that
oyster farming had major adverse ecological effects on the Estero.103
Moreover, it found that there was insufficient data to reach any conclusions
about impacts to harbor seals or other wildlife, and reported that oysters,
which have a beneficial localized filtering effect, could enhance overall
ecosystem services in the Estero.104 As for the Park Service’s conduct, the
NRC panel concluded that the Sheltered Wilderness report interpreted
existing science in a manner that “exaggerated the negative and overlooked
potentially beneficial effects” of the oyster culture operation.105 The NRC
found “several instances” where the Park Service “selectively presented, overinterpreted, or misrepresented” the available science on potential impacts.106
Media coverage of the report varied. Local news sources painted the
committee’s conclusions in adversarial terms, while both DBOC and
Seashore officials seemed to consider the report an exoneration.107
Seashore officials also criticized the NRC’s report and formally challenged
many of its findings.108 By and large, however, the hyperbole surrounding
the controversy and the weight of the decision cannot be overstated.109
Local environmental advocates, scholars, and laypeople argued that renewal
of the DBOC lease would jeopardize the wilderness system as a whole.110

103. Id. at 6, 86. The report generally accepted the data as presented in the
Clarification but highlighted two major weaknesses: First, it had over-interpreted
incomplete harbor seal disturbance data and, second, it did not recognize an
ecological baseline where native oysters played a historical role in structuring the
estuary’s ecosystem.
104.

Id. at 2, 68-69, 82.

105.

Id. at 3, 73.

106.

Id. at 72-73.

107. Fimrite, supra note 3 (reporting that oyster farm supporters “claimed
victory,” and that the report is “seen as vindication for the oyster company”).
108. Dr. John G. Dennis, Comment on the NRC REPORT, on behalf of the NAT’L
PARK SERVICE (June 16, 2009), available at http://mmc.gov/drakes_estero/pdfs/comm_
dennis_nas_rpt.pdf.
109. Felicity Barringer, A Park, an Oyster Farm and Science: Epilogue, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 4, 2012, http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/a-park-an-oyster-farm-andscience-epilogue/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2013) (“The hyperbole accompanying the
debate over the site’s future was bewilderingly grandiose.”).
110. Id.; see also Nylem et al., supra note 33, at 64-65 (“This outcome, and its
likely repetition across the country, would both harm local wilderness values and
chip away at the integrity of the Wilderness Act itself.”).
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Meanwhile, supporters of DBOC alleged widespread corruption, and even
conspiracy, among high-level Park Service officials.111
On May 5, 2009, the day the NRC report was released, Senator
Feinstein sent a letter to Interior Secretary Ken Salazar about the “troubling
and unacceptable” exaggerations made by the Park Service.112 A month later,
Feinstein succeeded in attaching a rider to the Senate Interior Department
appropriations.113 The rider provided that: “[N]otwithstanding any other
provision of law, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to issue a special
use permit with the same terms and conditions as the existing
authorization, except as provided herein, for a period of 10 years from
November 30, 2012.”114
The rider known now as section 124 required the Secretary to “take into
consideration” the NRC report regarding maricultural best practices in
making his decision.115 Finally, section 124 expressly foreclosed its
application in any other wilderness area and disclaimed any precedential
force for the decision.116
The rider was supported largely on the basis of the “bad science”
allegations.117 Just the year before, in 2008, Feinstein had proposed a rider
to extend the lease by ten years but was unsuccessful.118 The first version of
the 2009 bill provided for automatic extension, but when the head of the
CCC came forward with details of DBOC’s regulatory violations, Senator
Feinstein changed the bill to merely grant the Secretary discretion to extend
the lease “notwithstanding any other provision of law.”119
The Park Service subsequently undertook an environmental review
under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) to evaluate the

111. See Jane Gyorgy, Oyster Zone Blog, http://oysterzone.wordpress.com/ (last
visited Dec. 17, 2012); see also The Framing of an Oyster Farm (Visual Record, Oct. 28,
2012), http://vimeo.com/52331881 (last visited Feb. 27, 2013).
112. Ian Fein, Reassessing the Role of the National Research Council: Peer Review, Political
Tool, or Science Court?, 99 CAL. L. REV. 465, 494 (2011) (describing the history of the
rider).
113. See Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-88, § 124, 123 Stat. 2932 (2009).
114.

Id. (emphasis added).

115.

Id.

116. Id. (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to have any application to
any location other than Point Reyes National Seashore; nor shall anything in this
section be cited as precedent for management of any potential wilderness outside
the Seashore.”).
117.

See Fein, supra note 112, at 502–04.

118.

Id.; see also Fimrite, supra note 3.

119.

See Fein, supra note 112, at 502–04.
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effects of issuing an SUP to DBOC.120 The draft environmental impact
statement (“DEIS”), published in March of 2011, found that DBOC has a
“major impact” on the soundscape, a “major impact” on wilderness, and an
“adverse impact” on harbor seals, birds, and visitors’ recreational
experience.121 These findings have been peer reviewed multiple times, and
still uncertainty lingers. In 2011, Congress directed the National Academy of
Science to conduct another study, this time assessing “the validity of the
science underlying the DEIS.”122 The NAS assembled another panel, which
determined that the Park Service’s findings were uncertain at best, given that
the Park Service had little primary data on which to base the DEIS.123 Of the
eight resource categories examined, the projected impact levels had
moderate to high levels of uncertainty, such that it would be “equally
reasonable” to find lower impacts in many of these categories.124 The
Department of the Interior also commissioned an outside review of the DEIS
by Atkins North America.125 Although the reviewers identified minor “data
gaps” and “factual errors,” they ultimately found “no fundamental flaw with
the larger scientific underpinning of the DEIS.”126
On November 20, 2012, the final environmental impact statement
(“FEIS”) was released online, nine days before the Secretary’s November 29,
2012, decision, without publishing a notice in the Federal Register.127 DBOC
supporters maintain that the FEIS did not comply with NEPA’s procedural

120. See DEIS, supra note 4, at iii (“The purpose of this document is to use the
NEPA process to engage the public and evaluate the effects of issuing a SUP . . . [to
DBOC]. The results of the NEPA process [i.e., the Final EIS] will be used to inform
the decision of whether a new SUP should be issued to DBOC for a period of 10
years.”); see also 75 Fed. Reg. 65, 373 (Oct. 22, 2010) (“Pursuant to [NEPA], the
National Park Service is preparing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the
Drakes Bay Oyster Company Special Use Permit”). For more information on NEPA,
see 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006).
121.

NRC REPORT, supra note 90, at 12.

122.

H.R. REP. NO. 112-331, at 1057 (2011).

123. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, SCIENTIFIC REVIEW OF THE DRAFT
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: DRAKES BAY OYSTER COMPANY SPECIAL USE PERMIT
(Mar. 2012) [hereinafter 2012 NRC Report], available at http://www.nap.edu/
catalog.php?record_id=13461.
124.

Id. at 3.

125. See ATKINS NORTH AMERICA, REPORT ON PEER REVIEW OF THE SCIENCE USED IN
THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE’S DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: DRAKES BAY
OYSTER COMPANY SPECIAL USE PERMIT (Mar. 2012), available at http://www.
doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=284844.
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See FEIS, supra note 78.
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requirements.128 In furtherance of this claim, they highlight the Park
Service’s changed interpretation of its responsibilities under NEPA.129

IV.

The Secretary’s Memorandum of Decision: Finality at
Last

On November 29, 2012, after much anticipation, Secretary Ken Salazar
announced the DBOC lease would be allowed to expire, thereafter
converting Drakes Estero to full wilderness status.130 The Secretary’s
memorandum of decision expressly interprets section 124 as exempting the
Secretary from the requirements of NEPA.131 Salazar explained that his
decision was not based on scientific data, but “on matters of law and
policy.”132 The two principal considerations were (1) the explicit terms of the
1972 conveyance, which after much bargaining guaranteed no more than 40years of continued occupancy; and (2) Park Service policy regarding
commercial use of wilderness land and nonconforming uses of potential
wilderness, fashioned in conformance with Wilderness Act of 1964 and the
Point Reyes Wilderness Act of 1976.133
Although the Secretary conceded that “scientific methodology
employed by the NPS . . . generated much controversy and ha[s] been the
subject of several reports,”134 the decision was otherwise silent on the issue
of scientific misconduct. There was little reason to tread upon such a
128. NEPA requires that a federal agency submit its FEIS to EPA and provide
at least a thirty-day notice-and-comment period from the time of publication in the
Federal Register before the agency may make or record decision on the proposed
action. See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.9 and 40 C.F.R. §1506.10(b)(2).
129. Discussing its obligations under NEPA, the DEIS and FEIS differ in the
way each finishes the following statement: “Although the Secretary’s authority under
Section 124 is ‘not withstanding any other provision of law, the Department has
determined that . . . .” The DEIS follows with, “it is appropriate to prepare an EIS and
otherwise follow the procedures of NEPA.” DEIS, supra note 4, at iii (emphasis
added). Whereas the FEIS reads, “it is helpful to generally follow the procedures of
NEPA.” FEIS, supra note 68, at 2 (emphasis added).
130.

Salazar decision, supra note 9.

131. Id. at 5, fn. 4 (“Sec. 124 does not require me (or the NPS) to prepare a
DEIS or an [sic] FEIS or otherwise to comply with the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA) or any other law . . . . Sec. 124 expressly exempts my decision
from any substantive or legal requirements.”).
132. Id., fn. 5 (“My decision today is based on the incompatibility of
commercial activities in wilderness and not on the [EIS] data that was asserted to be
flawed.”).
133.

Id. at 1.

134.

Salazar decision, supra note 9, at 5.
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politically sensitive subject years after its occurrence, when it was not the
basis of the decision. But the Park Service’s sloppy science, and the
response of its officials, continues to be relevant in evaluating the final
outcome of the controversy, as well as agency decision-making more
broadly.
One month after the Secretary issued his decision, Lunny challenged
the decision in the U.S. District Court in the Northern District of California,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under NEPA, the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”), and the Fifth Amendment.135 Specifically, Lunny
alleged that the Secretary’s interpretation of section 124 as relieving the
agency of its NEPA obligations was “arbitrary and capricious” under section
706 of the APA.136 Furthermore, Lunny claimed that, despite express
statements to the contrary, the Secretary had relied on flawed data in the
FEIS and therefore failed to base the decision on “best available science,” as
he was obligated to do.137 The court disagreed that there had been reliance
on flawed scientific data,138 and ultimately held that the decision was
committed to agency discretion and therefore unreviewable under section
701(a)(2) of the APA.139

V.

Scientific Misconduct: Definition and Response

The Solicitor of the Interior’s office investigated allegations of
scientific misconduct in a memorandum released to the public in 2011.140 It
was then revealed that between 2007 and 2010, the Park Service had
installed hidden cameras, without the knowledge of DBOC or the public, and
collected nearly 300,000 photographs and detailed observational logs.141
Seashore officials failed to turn over this data, which belied any evidence of
harbor seal disturbances,142 to the NRC panel tasked with reviewing their

135. Complaint at 6-7, Drakes Bay Oyster Co., et al. v. Salazar, et al., 2013 WL
451860 (No. 12-CV-06134-YGR)(N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2013).
136.

Id.

137.

Id. at 20.

138. Drakes Bay Oyster Co., et al. v. Salazar, et al., 2013 WL 451860, *16 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 4, 2013.)
139.

Id. at *11.

140.

DOI OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR, PUBLIC REPORT ON ALLEGATIONS OF SCIENTIFIC
MISCONDUCT AT POINT REYES NATIONAL SEASHORE, CALIFORNIA (Mar. 22, 2011) [hereinafter
FROST REPORT], available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?cs
Module=security/getfile&pageid=238859.
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research during this time, or in response to Dr. Goodman’s FOIA request.143
The officials justified this by explaining that they did not consider the
camera surveillance system to be photographic research because the
photographs lacked established methodology and quality controls.144 Frost
questioned why, if this were true, the Park Service would continue the
research program without improving research quality.145 Nonetheless, he
determined that officials did intend to disclose the data.146 He found this
intent on the basis of a briefing statement submitted to Regional Director
Jon Jarvis three days before the NRC report was released to the public that
included an attachment with three photographs.147 He therefore concluded,
“NPS employees erred but did not misstep in any manner defined as
criminal misconduct or scientific misconduct for which the agency could
impose and successfully defend disciplinary action.”148
The obvious question, then, is what actions are sufficient to constitute
scientific misconduct? The answer is found in the actor’s intent. Scientific
misconduct would arise in situations where:
[I]ntentional acts produced a research record that did not
accurately represent information found in the photographic
data . . . . [Whereas] no scientific or research misconduct would
exist if unintentional, negligent mishandling of the photographic
data on and after those dates resulted in a research record that
inaccurately represented the digital photos and related
information.149
This definition is consistent with other definitions of misconduct used
within the executive and legislative branches. In 2000, the President’s Office
of Science and Technology Policy issued a unified policy applicable to all
federal-research-grant recipients, which remains in effect today, defining
research misconduct as “fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism in
proposing, performing, or reviewing research, or in reporting research

143.

Id. at 31.

144.

Id. at 28.

145.

Id. at 31.

146. Id. at 29 (“[N]o NPS employee manipulated or intentionally omitted the
photographic research in an effort to defraud, deceive, or mislead any person or
organization.”).
147. Id. at 18 (describing the attachment, which included three photos taken
from one camera).
148.

Id. at 35.

149.

Id. at 29.
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results.”150 According to the National Academy of Sciences, fabrication
consists of making up data or results, falsification means changing data or
results, and plagiarism is using the ideas or words of another person
without giving appropriate credit.151
Many scholars have argued for a broader view of scientific integrity,
one that encompasses more than the absence of overt fabrication,
falsification, and plagiarism.152 To begin with, we must understand scientific
misconduct in terms that encompass more shades of gray than what those
three categories allow. A key element in determining scientific misconduct
on the part of the investigative bodies is false representation; that is,
“reporting data that have not been observed or passing off for the
observation of nature what is a product of one’s imagination”153—all of
which requires intent to deceive.
Frost’s report demonstrates, however, that a definition that hinges on
the actor’s mental state will too often be difficult to prove and easy to
manipulate. The definition should be expanded to include a scientist’s
failure to include contradictory data in a publicly released report, where he
or she is shown to have had knowledge of its existence. In such a case,
failure to disclose seems reckless at best and intentional at worst—certainly
beyond an act of negligence. As long as scientific misconduct requires a
finding of fraudulent intent, independent investigations into agency science
may be vulnerable to conclusions that are, or appear to be, politically
motivated.
Assuming the best about the Solicitor’s findings—that is, there was
insufficient proof that the Park Service’s conduct amounted to the legal
standard of scientific misconduct—the agency unquestionably failed to live
up to its own standard of scientific conduct. By the time Frost conducted his
investigation, the Park Service had released an Interim Code of Scientific
and Scholarly Conduct, which did not exist at the time of the Sheltered
Wilderness report.154 An early draft of the Code of Scientific and Scholarly
Conduct was issued in 2004, but never actually finalized or formally applied
to employees.155 The Interim Code of Scientific and Scholarly Conduct
required all Park Service employees working with scientific information to:
“process data from, and communicate the results of scientific and scholarly
activities honestly, objectively, thoroughly, and expeditiously” and “fully

150. Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity. 86 TEX L. REV 1601, 1066, fn.
128 (2008).
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NRC REPORT, supra note 90, at 5.

152.

Doremus, supra note 150, at 1622.

153.

GERALD DWORKIN, MORALITY, HARM, AND THE LAW 69 (1984).

154.

FROST REPORT, supra note 140, at 9-10.

155.

Id. at 10, fn. 8.
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disclose all research methods used [and] available data . . . in a timely
manner and consistent with all laws and policy.”156 The Interim Guidance,
now superseded by the formal policy on “Integrity of Scientific and Scholarly
Activities,”157 became effective in January of 2008.158
Publicly putting forth such a standard is an important first step in
ensuring agency accountability. Frost’s report stated that the Department
“may address the mistakes and restore public trust by concluding that
several NPS employees could and should have handled research differently
and by modifying the future behavior of NPS employees with education and
corrective action as deemed appropriate.”159 To that end, the Park Service
issued the Clarification report discussed earlier, as well as an
“Acknowledgement of Corrections,”160 stating that it had “incorrectly
interpreted” the studies cited in its Wilderness report. Such a gentle
admission of error is not enough to restore public trust.
Evidence that the issue is not yet moot is found in the Inspector
General’s most recent investigation, released February 7, 2013, in response
to allegations that the Park Service and its consultant had committed
scientific misconduct in the DEIS.161 Specifically, it was alleged that Park
Services officials had misrepresented soundscape data by using inaccurate
proxies for DBOC equipment rather than taking on-site noise
measurements.162 The Inspector General ultimately concluded there was no
fraud, waste, abuse, or misrepresentation of data by researchers who found
that DBOC boats had an impact on nearby harbor seals.163 As for the Park
Service’s use of proxy data, the report stated it was “reasonable and justified

156. Id. at 10 (discussing the “Interim Guidance Document Governing Code of
Conduct, Peer Review, and Information Quality Correction for National Park Service
Cultural and Natural Resources Disciplines”).
157. NAT’L PARK SERVICE, Director’s Order #79: Integrity of Scientific and
Scholarly Activities 2 (Sept. 19, 2012), fhttp://www.nps.gov/policy/Director’s_
Order_79.pdf; see also FROST REPORT, supra note 140, at 10, fn. 8.
158.

Id. at 9.

159.

Id. at 32.

160. NAT’L PARK SERV., Acknowledgment of corrections to previous versions of the Park
News document “Drakes Estero—A Sheltered Wilderness Estuary,” http://www.mmc.gov/
drakes_estero/pdfs/corr_nps_072507.pdf (last visited Feb. 28. 2013).
161. U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT OF DRAKES BAY OYSTER COMPANY
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (Feb. 7, 2013), available at http://www.doi.gov/oig/
reports/upload/DrakesBayOysterCompany_Public.pdf. While the report does not
directly identify the complainant, it describes him as “an elected member of the
National Academy of Sciences and adjunct professor at a California University.” Id. at 2.
162.

Id. at 1.

163.

Id.
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based on mechanical similarities” to DBOC equipment,164 especially given
that “company noise emissions had never been named as having a potential
impact on the environment or wildlife.”165 One wonders, then, why the Park
Service bothered collecting, or even approximating such data from the
beginning. However, the Inspector General reported that the EIS was not
viewed as a “scientific research paper,”166 and the Park Service need not
collect new data for an EIS “unless there is a clear data gap.”167
At the time that the Park Service issued the Sheltered Wilderness
report, the DBOC had no entitlement to lease renewal, and the Department
of the Interior had already taken the position that it had no such authority.168
Nonetheless, Park Service officials no doubt anticipated that nonextension
of the DBOC lease would create controversy and, in anticipation of public
response, it may have released the report for the purpose of turning the
public against continued DBOC operations. In light of the difficult decision
it faced, the agency was right to look to objective measures, including
scientific study, to fully account for the costs and benefits of allowing DBOC
to continue operating in what otherwise would be full wilderness. The
problem was that the Park Service used science to shield itself from
exposing political judgments that would likely be unpopular in the local
community. Had the agency been subtler about its scientific claims, or had
key community players not gotten involved, the tactic might have been
successful in deflecting political pressure—but at what cost?

VI.

The Role of Science in the Secretary’s Decision

Though the Secretary acknowledged the “scientific uncertainty” and
“lack of consensus” surrounding the DBOC’s environmental impacts, he
stated that the DEIS and FEIS “have informed me with respect to the
complexities, subtleties, and uncertainties of this matter and have been
helpful to me in making my decision.”169 Both the DEIS and the FEIS
supported the proposition that removal of DBOC would provide long-term
beneficial impacts to Drakes Estero.170 Furthermore, while section 124 would
have allowed him to issue a new SUP regardless, it did not require him to, as
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Id. at 37.
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Id. at 10.
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DOI Memo, supra note 8.
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Salazar decision, supra note 9, at 5.

170.

Id.
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section 124 “in no way overrides the intent of Congress as expressed in the
1976 act to establish wilderness at the Estero.”171
Despite the manifold criticism surrounding the Park Service’s
allegations of DBOC’s deleterious impacts, my research has revealed
nothing that would refute the only scientific claim relied upon in making the
decision, which is that DBOC’s removal will have a long-term benefit on the
Estero’s natural environment.172 It is far more difficult to prove that DBOC’s
operations are ecologically harmful than it is to claim that its removal will
be ecologically beneficial in the long-term. It seems hard to refute as a
matter of basic intuition and common sense, given the farm’s heavy shellfish
output and the traffic it creates. While the uncertain science has led to a
series of prominent reviews by the National Academy of Sciences in 2009
and again in 2012, the Marine Mammal Commission,173 the U.S. Geological
Survey,174 and Atkins North America,175 these reports largely center on
matters of methodology and magnitude. They stress the uncertainty of the
scientific analyses rather than provide new facts about which all parties can
be certain. Borrowing from the field of criminal law, one might say these
peer reviews demonstrate that DBOC is “not guilty” of the ecological harm
the Park Service had accused them of, but they prove nothing close to DBOC
ecological “innocence.”
The trouble is, however, that wilderness is actually a cultural concept
rather than an ecological one.176 The Act’s description of land “untrammeled
by man . . . retaining . . . primeval character and influence”177 reflects a
conception of wilderness that is far more sociological than biological—a
conviction to protect and preserve those few areas yet untouched by the
destructive human hand. From that standpoint, the conversion of Drakes
Estero to full wilderness status in 2012 presented a political problem from

171.

Id. at 6.

172. Salazar decision, supra at 9, at 5 (“Although there is scientific uncertainty
and a lack of consensus in the record regarding the precise nature and scope of the
impacts that DBOC’s operations have on wilderness resources, . . . the DEIS and FEIS
support the proposition that the removal of DBOC’s operations in the estero would
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the beginning. As biologically important as Drakes Estero may be, it is
simply not a place “untrammeled by man.” However rural its landscape, it
has not retained its “primeval character and influence.” Worse yet, DBOC
enjoyed a great deal of community support and a reputation as a local, even
sustainable, food source. The Point Reyes National Seashore was full of
pristine locales already, and DBOC does not on first blush appear to be so
different from the agricultural operations nearby. The cultural case against
DBOC—that is, for full wilderness designation—would have been hard to
win, even in the left-leaning community of Point Reyes. It is no surprise
then that the Park Service turned to science to justify what would certainly
be a politically unpopular decision, even if it considered the decision to be
mandated by law.
In some ways, the actions taken by the Park Service can be understood,
perhaps even explained, by looking to the larger social and legal forces from
which they sprang. The Park Service found itself pressured by the increasing
public expectation that sound science ought to be the major driver of
regulatory decisions.178 The use of science in natural resource management
ensures that the most precise and accurate information available is factored
into decisions made by agencies in furtherance of societal goals.179 Not only
does it assist decision-makers, but it also constrains them in limiting the
exercise of discretion and guarding against anti-regulatory influences and
interests.180 In other words, there are good reasons to insist that agencies
make discretionary decisions in accordance with, or at least not in
contravention of, clearly established scientific data. But even if the Park
Service properly felt it was accountable to the public for the scientific
validity of its decisions, the manner in which it chose to meet that
obligation not only threatened public confidence in the Park Service, but
also in agency decision-making more broadly.
Opponents of the lease renewal have argued that the critique of junk
science is merely a red herring in the quest for wilderness protection. In
their estimation, Lunny and his supporters have cleverly inflated scientific
uncertainties and exploited public perception in order to achieve an
outcome that would otherwise have been impossible under the Wilderness
Act as it has been applied by the Park Service and interpreted by the courts.
The American public, acting through Congress, chose to create a national
wilderness preservation system at the expense of local commercial interests,
and it further chose to designate Drakes Bay as a place worthy of such
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protection. The terms of the statute and the accompanying legislative
reports reveal that it intended Drakes Estero to receive official wilderness
status as soon as the 40-year lease expired, with very little room for agency
discretion. Both the Wilderness Act and the Point Reyes National Seashore
wilderness designation were borne out of the democratic process, and after
such intensive national deliberation, the goals reflected therein should be
treated as controlling.
Though these arguments are very compelling, it is nonetheless
important to recognize that the end does not justify the means. In fact, the
means threaten the very end wilderness proponents seek to protect. In this
case, the “means” bear on the basic functionality of our representative
government—the legitimacy of our political institutions, the trustworthiness
of federal officials, and the willingness of community members to engage in
the political process. If land management agencies are permitted to use
such tactics when we happen to approve of their overarching objective, there
is nothing to protect against the same kind of tactics from being used in
furtherance of an environmentally deleterious one. In some ways, it is a
good thing that the Park Service’s scientific methods were so lackluster
because it has provided an opportunity to address the underlying problem
of secretive data gathering and improper public presentation. Without such
verifiably false scientific allegations, the harm would certainly manifest itself
later when those same problematic practices were employed again with an
inevitably less fortuitous result. Thus, the Drakes Bay controversy provides
what might be a rare opportunity to critique the agency’s decision-making
process rather than its ultimate outcome.
It is no coincidence that many American conservation heroes have
historically been trained in the sciences.181 It is often thought, or hoped,
that requiring agencies to base their regulatory decisions on science will
tone down intense conflicts over the allocation of scarce natural
resources.182 But as this case illustrates, it also has the potential to do just
the opposite. When scientific evidence is improperly collected and reported
in an effort to support agency decision-making as it was here, what is at
stake is not just passing public outrage, but lingering distrust. Because
science is often considered the arbiter of truth in the modern era, its misuse
has profoundly detrimental impacts. If we no longer trust science as a check
on technically complex agency decision-making, what else do we have?
The public distrust of the Park Service continues to manifest itself long
after the original Sheltered Wilderness report and the cover-up that
followed. What is significant about the most recent Inspector General report
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is that it confirms the real-world consequences of having lost the public’s
confidence. When science fails to provide these reassurances, we are left
with internal watchdogs whose investigations necessarily occur behind
closed doors. There is no “peer review,” and thus, the value of their
conclusions is limited by the trust we place in them. Although the Office of
the Inspector General is an entity distinct from the Park Service, whose
purpose is to provide an independent voice,183 they are both housed within
the Department of the Interior; therefore distrust of the former bleeds into
the latter. Thus, everyone suffers when agencies use science inappropriately
in their decision-making—the public is left with no meaningful mechanism
for reassurance and the government is left with no meaningful way to
provide it. The public will continue making allegations of misconduct, and
the government in turn will spend precious tax dollars refuting them. The
problem is not just abstract or academic.
Wilderness management is fundamentally different from most other
legal mechanisms for natural resource protection. Here, the wilderness
management directives are unusually clear, and the law upon which it is
based overwhelmingly favors preservation over commerce.184
The
Wilderness Act is unlike other environmental statutes in that it does not
place much emphasis on precision and accuracy. Rather than providing for
technical formulations, the Act is poetic in language and broad in
application. The statute includes far-reaching prohibitions on commercial
enterprise with limited exceptions made to accommodate historical use and
allow for the basic necessities of wilderness management,185 to the extent
necessary for “realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes of the
area.”186 Regardless of how one sees DBOC—at best, the provider of a
sustainable food source, a historical relic of the area’s maricultural
traditions, even an integral part of visitors’ recreational enjoyment—it does
not fall into the Act’s allowable exceptions. Although Congress did not
explicitly dictate in the Act that that these prohibitions apply equally to
potential wilderness areas, it did clearly express such intent in its
accompanying reports. Like all issues involving congressional intent, there
may be some room for leeway, but in the long run, DBOC would have to go.
There might have been good reasons to extend the lease, but an
additional ten years would only have prolonged the acrimonious debate.
The scientific basis of the Secretary’s decision, as well as the administrative
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actions that preceded it, remain the source of great controversy. No doubt
more scientific reports and expert testimony will be generated in the course
of the litigation following it. But science will not provide the definitive
answer to the case, nor will it in the wilderness management decisions of
the future. Rather, judicial precedent and national wilderness policy will
circumscribe these decisions, so long as the statutory scheme and agency
management policies remain as they are. In the meantime, our political
decision-makers must use careful analysis, subject to peer review, to inform
value-laden decisions, not disguise them. Thus, the Secretary’s decision is to
be applauded insofar as it openly accounted for the difficult political
judgments made in reaching it. And for those who would like more
flexibility in wilderness management to allow local food producers on such
lands, we must look to our congressional representatives to properly drive
that change.
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